Ten long years of war have passed in Afghanistan and although it is finally coming to an end, the details of the enemy are still murky. The Taliban are the modern day band of misfits which have occupied the lime light on newspapers, headlines and talk shows. A lack of true understanding about the nature and motives of the Taliban has propagated the formation of stereotypes which have further made it confusing for the common man to understand the war in which thousands of lives and millions of funds have been sacrificed. The nuances in Taliban’s belief and objectives already pose a challenge for policy makers to reach a mutually acceptable deal, in addition to which, the public’s confusion regarding the Taliban becomes another knot to entangle in the yarn of disorder.
The aftermath of the Soviet War in Afghanistan left a power vacuum. Local tribes now battled against each other for control of areas. Security deteriorated and many human right violations were committed against women and children. It was in these conditions that the Taliban movement emerged under Mullah Omer in Kandahar in 1994. It was a simple localized movement that sought to restore order in line with the local culture and Islamic teachings. With the Pakistanis and the Saudis backing the Taliban, the movement picked by momentum and by 1996, Kabul had been captured.
Post-soviet invasion was a detrimental period for the law and order situation in Afghanistan. All legal documents and the ministry of justice were destroyed. At that time the only law of the land was that of Pashtunwali. Mason describes this customary law as a code of ethics and norms…[which includes]… rules used for decision making in jirgas/shuras and a traditional code of conduct structuring social behavior. It constitutes of principles like honor, revenge and hospitality. By emphasizing community consensus in legal matters, this approach is more restorative rather than retributive.
Founders of the Taliban movement were Afghan Pashtun refugees who had acquired education in madrassas, religious schools located in Pakistan. These madrassas were supervised by the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e Islam (JUI) which preached a Deobandi/Wahabi form of Islam. Many of the injunctions laid down in this kind of Islam coincided with the principles of Pashtunwali. In effect, the Taliban were promoting a form of Islam which was heavily influenced by local traditions.
After the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban found themselves being targeted due to their affiliation with al-Qaeda. It was back in 1996 that Bin Laden came to stay in Jalalabad in Afghanistan and the friendship between Omer and Bin Laden increased. Nevertheless, Bin Laden had a different agenda which on several occasions clashed with those of Omer. It was with much
Afghan Taliban were enraged by the forceful intervention of Western forces especially when they were replaced by a pro-American government under Hamid Karzai. This fall from the pedestal costed the Taliban a loss of power and resources. Many of the poor and unemployed were actually motivated to join troops in hope for greater economic security. For many of the Taliban members, western occupation of their territory threatened Afghan culture and Islamic values. This jihad is therefore justified to them. Furthermore, the loss of civilian lives dismissed by armies under the title of “collateral damage” continued to fuel the insurgency.
The goals and objectives of the Taliban leaders vary according to their hometown and localized issues. However, the overarching objective of all Taliban leaders is to expel foreign forces and establish the Sharia. Their methods and priorities may differ. Most feel that religious scholars or ulema should have a greater role in governance and justice. The Taliban want to establish a government free from corruption and illegal practices. Western ideas and influence especially regarding women and media are admonished.
Across the Durand Line, the Tehrik-e-Taliban, also known as Pakistani Taliban are a conglomerate of various tribal militants such as Hakimullah Mehsud and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah (Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi). TTP surfaced in 2007 after the Pakistani Army initiated a military operation against tribal militants residing in Waziristan in 2002. Their current strength ranges from 30,000 to 35,000 soldiers. Over the years, a series of suicide attacks and the PNS Mehran incident has removed any misconceptions about TTP being a feeble opposition.
TTP is dominated by the Mehsud tribe from South Waziristan but also includes local tribes which joined forces in hope to boost their prestige and improve their access to resources. In addition, Sunni militants located in Punjab also support the TTP.
Similar to the Afghan Taliban, TTP follow the Deobandi interpretation of Islam and disapprove of foreign occupation particularly that of the United States. They also regard the current Pakistani leaders and army to be bootlickers of Western powers, an immense disgrace to Muslims. As a result, the constitution and government established by these rules is contrary to the Sharia. Their battle is not localized like that of the Afghan Taliban but supports the notion on a global level. It is on the basis of such an ideology that Pakistani Taliban have backed the Afghan Taliban in their fight against coalition forces.
The TTP has routinely asserted their support for the Afghan Taliban even though the latter does not participate in the operation of the former and has even disapproved of the damages to the Pakistani army and the civilians. But TTP has cleverly used locals’ veneration for Afghan Taliban as a way to attract recruits.
Despite these differences, the Afghan Taliban have chosen not to divorce themselves completely from the TTP. The latter’s consent is vital to ensure the safety of their sanctuaries in Pakistan and keep the door open for recruits.
There have been instances which show some camaraderie between the two Taliban forces. In 2009, Mullah Omar is said to have sent emissaries to the TTP to regroup and help them fight the American forces in Afghanistan. The request was fulfilled when TTP leaders formed the Council of United Mujahedeen and promised to aid their Afghan counterparts. Again in 2012, reports claimed that Mullah Omar had requested TTP to curtail suicide attacks, kidnapping and killing in Pakistan to focus their attention on US troops in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, Afghan Taliban have denied any such association with the Pakistan Taliban for they wish to maintain their status as an indigenous movement focused only on Afghanistan. But Afghan Taliban are closely related to the Pakistani army in carrying out their operations. The two worked together in the Soviet War and even now, intelligence reports assert the Pakistani Army and the ISI work closely with the militants. Although the ISI is not controlling the Afghan Taliban, as a strong financial, military and security sponsor it can have a great amount of
The Pakistani army may in fact be acting with foresight as the withdrawal of coalition forces would leave the battlefield primarily open to local agents. Strong links with the potential future leaders of Afghanistan would be in Pakistan’s interests. This could also benefit the Pakistani government which could use the Taliban to balance the presence of other agents especially that of India. Pakistan may in fact be willing to soften its stance against the Afghan Taliban now that the latter does not regard India as an enemy any more.
Pakistani government has vehemently opposed drone attacks as being an infringement on their sovereignty. These strikes target the al-Qaeda and its affiliates which are a threat to the US national security. Even though Pakistan has lost many civilian lives in these attacks they have been beneficial in taking down TTP leaders like Baitullah Mehsud.
The War of Terror has many players each with its own loyalties and agenda, which as the above discussion shows, do conflict with each other. This is one of the major factors why the War on Terror has been controversial and slow at showing progress. For all the state actors as well as the non-state actors it has been a testing time to pick sides. Realistically speaking, a final settlement of the Afghan endgame will disadvantage one as compared to another. It’s only a question of who will be disadvantaged more.
The Afghan Taliban seem to be focused on improving the state of their nation in the next few years. The Pakistani Taliban, whose purpose is strongly linked to the Afghan Taliban may become extinct as the US forces leave the region. There is a chance that the regional security may improve and the Pakistani government may finally have a chance to channelize its attention to internal matters.
At the same time, TTP could regard US withdrawal as a sign of success and become bolder. It could even demand a greater share in the Pakistani government just like the government in Afghanistan plans to accommodate the Taliban. In the long run, TTP may decide to extend itself globally and chose to side with al-Qaeda in its anti-West movement.
Tacstrat AnalysisBy Nida Afaque
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