Russia would know better than any country that overcoming the adversarial mindset on the other side of the ‘Wall’ is never easy. It not only takes time, it involves a leap of faith. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974, lives on eternally despite the ‘non-existence’ of the USSR and its restrictions on Jewish emigration; its repeal is solely now the function of politics in the United States – and not of Russian policy or politics.
Of course, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is an extreme case of how time stands still when it is patently obvious that the mindset has become hopelessly archaic. But the analogy helps comprehend the meaning of the difficult decision Pakistan took Thursday to accord ‘Most-Favoured Nation’ [MFN] status to India in trade relations. It took a decade-and-a-half for Pakistan to reciprocate India’s own MFN decision of 1996.
Surely, the Pakistani decision is more complex that what America needs to take with regard to reset of ties with post-Soviet Russia. The US and the USSR only fought ‘proxy wars’, while India and Pakistan fought both proxy and ‘real’ wars and both sides have relentlessly wrought death and destruction on each other. While the US has no reason to harbor Manichean fears that Russian exports might swarm its market and probably debilitate its industry, Pakistan’s worries are real. The Indian industry happens to be by far bigger than Pakistan’s and is increasingly acquiring killer instincts in the global market. Finally, while ‘cold warriors’ are a dime a dozen in the US still, they don’t have the lethal punch of the ‘jihadis’ in Pakistan who threaten against any MFN decision by Islamabad until Kashmir is ‘liberated’.
Thus, whichever way one looks at it, Pakistani government has shown statesmanship in according the MFN status to India. How did this happen? The meaning of it holds much significance for regional security and stability.
First, the blossom didn’t appear from nowhere. In a manner of speaking, it is a precocious, unseasonal flowering out of a mere sapling – the sapling of ‘dialogue’ between the two countries, which is still tender and vulnerable to blight.
The dialogue process began originally under persistent US prodding but has since been struggling to come on its own and has apparently survived the chill in the US-Pakistan relationship. In the US calculus originally, India-Pakistan normalization would go hand-in-hand with its overall regional AfPakstrategy, thereby creating synergy. In the event, though, disequilibrium appeared with the virtual collapse of the US’s AfPak strategy. Despite subtle US hint in the recent months to collaboratein a ‘pincer move’ toward Pakistan (with a view to salvage the US’s moribund AfPak strategy), Delhi seems to have opted to trek its own trail in self-interest.
Maybe, it is only Delhi’s congenital indecisiveness and procrastination, but Islamabad chooses to appreciate India’s ‘neutrality’ or ‘strategic autonomy’ vis-à-vis the US-Pakistan standoff. A sign of it came two weeks ago, when an Indian military helicopter with 3 senior army officers on board strayed in bad weather deep into Pakistani territory in the super-sensitive Siachen sector in Kashmir and the GHQ in Rawalpindi took the decision to allow the helicopter to return within a matter of hours – a rare gesture (for both sides) in the chronicle of the troubled relationship.
The latest decision on the MFN status gives further confirmation that the Pakistan wishes to continue on the dialogue track with India, regardless of the deepening chill in Pakistan-US ties. For argument’s sake, Pakistan’s statesmanlike approach stems from complicated motives. Indeed, Pakistan needs to focus single-mindedly on finessing its standoff with the US and also grapple with the existential questions of the Afghan endgame – Durand Line, Pashtunistan issue, ‘Talibanization’ of the afpak region – rather than get sidetracked in a skirmish with India in the Hindu Kush. Thus, arguably, Pakistan would calibrate its overall posturing toward India and the MFN decision could be a smart move to create a ‘feel-good’ air among India’s elites, in particular its influential business elites.
But in political terms, it puts pressure on India to reciprocate. The deep irony is that despite the ‘democracy-deficit’ in Pakistan, the dialogue process enjoys broad support in the Pakistani opinion, while it is viewed with widespread skepticism in the Indian opinion.The Pakistani leadership has now thrown the gauntlet at India to come up with something ‘doable’ like its MFN decision to take the normalization process forward.
The sensible thing will be to put into the pipeline one or two eminently ‘doable’ issues – eg., Sir Creek or Siachen – on which agreement is possible. Ideally, the agreement on one or two of the ‘doable’ issues could be an occasion for the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to undertake a long-awaited visit to Pakistan. That is, if wishes had wings.
More to the point, Pakistan’s MFN decision throws up a profound question as regards the kind of long-term relationship that the two countries should aim at. The MFN decision is in some ways a CBM [confidence-building measure]. Growing trade and investment relations can create a climate of trust and confidence in which the two countries would have the presence of mind to address the intractable differences. Pakistan has taken a bold step, albeit a baby step, toward integrating its economy with India’s. In a way, Pakistan is not averse to being a ‘stakeholder’ in relations with India.
Meanwhile, India prefers to focus more and more on China as its principal national security challenge and would like to ‘downgrade’ its Pakistan problem as a sideshow. But in reality the two foreign-policy challenges are intertwined and will remain so for a conceivable future – although, whatever China does in Pakistan is becoming increasingly less and less ‘India-centric’.
The trickiest part is going to be India’s massive ‘modernization programme’ for its armed forces, running in excess of 100 billion dollars in the short term itself. India is planning to increase the size of its 1.1 million-strong army by 10 percent. It is largely a response to India’s threat perceptions of China. But there is no public debate in India in the country’s present intellectual climateas regards the impact of the militarization on India’s political economy but also as to how this militarization would play out in regional politics.
The heart of the matter is that more than Kashmir issue, it is the ‘strategic balance’ with India that is creating angst in the Pakistani mind. Paradoxically, this angst impacts on Pakistan’s relationship with the US, too – and indirectly on its participation in the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan as well. The US, on its part, pillories Pakistan incessantly for its ‘doublespeak’ on the Afghan war while at the same time not missing out on a single opportunity to cash in on India’s arms bazaar, either.
Even in the midst of the current standoff in ties with Pakistan, while stridently demanding that Pakistan should ‘squeeze’ its ‘strategic assets’ – Haqqani Network – US secured a back-to-back firm booking from India for yet another six pieces of C-17 Globemaster III military transport aircraft worth billion of dollars and the Pentagon showed willingness to work with India on its futuristic ‘fifth-generation’ stealth-fighter aircraft. And all this while Uncle Sam is all dressed up and raring to go to mediate in India-Pakistan disputes.
In sum, the geopolitics of the region cast their shadow on India-Pakistan relationship as much as their bilateral disputes and differences. How to break this vicious circle? This is where a regional security canopy under which India and Pakistan cohabitate would serve a big purpose.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO] is uniquely placed to play such a role in regional security… Looking ahead, Pakistan’s MFN decision would mesh with the SCO’s prospective plans for a free trade area in the coming decade. It also coincides with Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organization [WTO]. In turn, with Russia’s WTO membership, Moscow and Delhi are all set to conclude a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement that is awaiting signature. To be sure, a decision by the SCO at this juncture to admit India and Pakistan as full members will be most timely.
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